Where is the Cuban economy heading? by Herrera, Rémy
Where is the Cuban economy heading ?
Re´my Herrera
To cite this version:
Re´my Herrera. Where is the Cuban economy heading ?. Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences
Economiques 2006.32 - ISSN 1624-0340. 2006. <halshs-00113546>
HAL Id: halshs-00113546
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00113546
Submitted on 13 Nov 2006
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 boulevard de L'Hôpital, 75647  Paris Cedex 13
http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/Publicat.htm
ISSN : 1624-0340
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne
UMR 8174
       
Where is the Cuban economy heading!?
Rémy HERRERA
2006.32
CAHIERS DE LA MSE                                   Série rouge CAHIER N° R06032 
 
 1
 
WHERE IS THE CUBAN 
ECONOMY HEADING? 
 
Rémy HERRERA  (CNRS)* 
 
 
 
 
Summary  This article is the introduction of an issue (to be published) of the U.S. 
review International Journal of Political Economy on the Cuban economy, and 
coordinated by Rémy Herrera. It deals with the progresses, but also with the 
deficiencies, of the Cuban revolution in the economic field, until the recent de-
dollarization. It underlines its economic challenges at the beginning of the XXIst 
century, as well as its internal forces and its external opportunities facing these 
challenges. 
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Où va l’économie cubaine 
 
Résumé   Cet article est l’introduction d’un numéro à paraître de la revue états-
unienne International Journal of Political Economy consacré à l’économie cubaine et 
coordonné par Rémy Herrera. Il dresse un bilan synthétique des avancées, mais aussi 
des insuffisances, de la révolution cubaine dans le domaine économique, jusqu’à la 
récente dé-dollarisation, en plaçant l’accent sur les défis économiques du pays au début 
du XXIe siècle, comme sur ses atouts internes et ses opportunités externes face à ces 
défis. 
 
Mots-clés 
Développement, socialisme, révolution, croissance, dé-dollarisation, dépenses sociales. 
 
 
JEL Classification 
 
J43, J71, N36, N40, O10, O13, O54, P16, P51. 
 
CAHIERS DE LA MSE                                   Série rouge CAHIER N° R06032 
 
 2
WHERE IS THE CUBAN ECONOMY HEADING? 
 
Rémy HERRERA 
 
From a strictly economic point of view, Cuba’s growth performance from 1959 to 
1989, in relative terms, was far from bad—despite strong external pressure, especially 
from the U.S. embargo. Between 1959 and 1989, the Cuban economy recorded an 
average growth rates in its annual gross domestic product (GDP) of almost 5 percent 
(Figure 1, Table 1). Measured according to the final social product and to the global 
social product, the growth rates were, respectively, 4.8 percent and 4.4 percent. The 
average GDP per capita grew slightly more than 3 percent per annum. As a 
consequence, over the same period, Cuba bears comparison rather well with the other 
Latin American countries. Cuban GDP in 1989 was only slightly less than that of Brazil 
and was at almost the same level as that of Mexico. On the contrary, at that time, it 
remained higher than that achieved by Argentina, Chile, Peru, and (prerevolutionary) 
Venezuela. The results obtained by Cuba between 1959 and 1989, compared with the-
then socialist countries (USSR and in Eastern Europe) are clear: At the end of the period, 
Cuba ranked first.1 
Entry into the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) provided the Cuban 
economy with strong motivation; but in 1989, its national income, expressed by per 
capita aggregate net value of material production, remained less than half that of the 
USSR. The major feature of the Cuban economy over these three decades remained its 
dependence on external markets, mainly due to the island’s specialization in sugar. The 
influence of external factors has always been important, sometimes even decisive, in 
accelerating (CMEA) or decelerating (U.S. embargo) the strategies implemented by the 
revolution. In spite of strong constraints, and some insufficiencies, these strategies made 
it possible for the national economy to realize considerable advances in agriculture, 
industry, and infrastructure. 
One of the brightest successes of the revolution is undoubtedly the creation of a 
high-quality pharmaceutical and biotechnological complex—with integration of science, 
production, and services. The third plan (1986–90) supported the production of a broad 
range of goods in the electronics sector, including semiconductors, components of 
personal computers, software, medical equipment, industrial automation, television 
sets, air conditioners, and refrigerators. However, even with this rather favourable 
assessment, we cannot overlook the insufficiencies and deficiencies that persisted in the 
Cuban economy at the end of the 1980s. To recognize these weaknesses is to make a 
historical observation, but to consider relations between Cuba and the USSR as the 
continuation of a neocolonial pact, under the cover of socialism, is to make an 
ideological judgment. The Soviet Union did not own any means of production or land. 
Even if Cuba never succeeded in being a self-reliant country, its socioeconomic 
development only started in 1959–60, with the implementation of the socialist project. 
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The collapse of the Soviet Union pushed the Cuban economy into an extremely 
serious crisis. In the 1990s, the government’s response was to maximize the flow of 
foreign currencies in order to increase import capacities and to guarantee both the needs 
of the people and the conditions of the recovery.  
 
Figure 1. Evolution of Cuban GDP from 1959 to 2005 
(billion dollars, at constant 1981 prices) 
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Sources: Calculations by the author, from Álvarez (1998) and Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas 
(various years). 
Note: The calculation of GDP in 2005 was based on the first half of the year. 
 
Table 1. GDP Growth Rate in Cuba by Historical Periods: 1959–2005 
(annual averages, expressed as a percentage) 
 
 
 
1959-1960 : 
1961-1963 : 
1964-1966 : 
1967-1970 : 
1971-1975 : 
1976-1981 : 
1982-1985 : 
1986-1990 : 
1991-1994 : 
1995-2000 : 
2001-2002 : 
2003-2005 : 
 
 
+1,5 
-0,4 
+6,5 
+2,0 
+7,4 
+5,5 
+5,3 
+0,1 
-9,5 
+4,5 
+2,1 
+5,9 
 
 
Source: Calculations by the author. 
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The dismantling of CMEA, in which the foreign trade of Cuba was integrated and 
which protected it from the risks of the world markets, caused a brutal fall in exports (–
79 percent) and imports (–73 percent) between 1990 and 1993. This followed sharp falls 
in investment and consumption, amplified by the hardening of the U.S. embargo and 
foreign indebtedness. Productivity fell, as did GDP (–35 percent in volume between 1989 
and 1993). The crisis hardly affected sugar production (Table 3). The budget deficit grew 
because of public enterprises accounts and the political decisions to preserve, in spite of 
scarce resources, social cohesion by limiting the degradation of employment, wages, 
food distribution, education, and health care. It was quite different in the Russian 
“transition” to capitalism (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Effects of the Adjustments to the Crises in the 1990s: 
Comparison with Russia and Cuba 
 
 
 
 
Life expectancy – men: 1990 (years) 
Life expectancy – men: 1994 (years) 
 
Life expectancy – women: 1990 (years) 
Life expectancy – women: 1994 (years) 
 
Infant mortality rate: 1990 (for 1,000 births) 
Infant mortality rate: 1993 (for 1,000 births) 
 
Crude birth rate: 1993 (for 1,000 inhabitants)  
Crude death rate: 1993 (for 1,000 inhabitants) 
 
Population growth rate: 1990-2000 (%) 
GDP growth rate: 1990-2000 (%) 
 
Population: 1990 (million inhabitants) 
Population: 2000 (million inhabitants) 
 
Number of inhabitants per physician: 1994 
Nutrition: 1994 (calories per day) 
 
Access to drinking water – urban zones: 1994 (%) 
Access to drinking water – rural zones: 1994 (%) 
 
Gini Coefficient of income inequalities: 1990 
Gini Coefficient of income inequalities: 1994 
 
Population below poverty line: 1990 (%) 
Population below poverty line: 1993-96 (%) 
 
 
Russia 
 
63.8 
57.3 
 
74.3 
71.1 
 
17.4 
19.9 
 
9.6 
15.7 
 
-0.3 
-5.1 
 
148.3 
145.5 
 
224 
2427 < x < 3386 
 
77 
65 
 
0.256 
0.412 
 
10 
23 < x < 35 
 
 
Cuba 
 
72.9 
73.6 
 
76.5 
76.9 
 
11.1 
9.4 
 
16.9 
6.8 
 
+0.6 
-1.9 
 
10.7 
11.3 
 
202 
2833 
 
93 
85 
 
0.25 
0.38 
 
6.3 
14.7 
 
 
Sources: IMF (1995), World Bank (1996), OECD (1995), Oficina nacional de Estadísticas (various 
years), and Ferriol Muruaga (2004). 
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As Fidel Castro declared in October 1997, during the Fifth Congress of the 
Communist Party of Cuba: “We did not like much tourism, everybody knows it; however, we 
developed tourism by preparing us to support its disadvantages. . . . We did not like foreign 
investments much either; but development required capital, one needed capital, therefore we 
needed to accept foreign investments. . . . We accepted the sending of currencies from abroad, 
whereas we had always refused to do it. . . . It was necessary to forge the conviction and to hold 
the promise to resist, to fight and to win, even if we would have been absolutely alone. . . . We 
could not give up, nor weaken, that would not have been worthy of the history of this country, 
nor of what our ancestors did. It is about a struggle, and in the struggle, the essential, it is the 
people, its conscience, its spirit of sacrifice, its sense of honor, its freedom, its independence. And 
the people is the people, which surprises everyone by its virtues, that never discourage the actions 
of those who tire, pass to the enemy or are deprived of the values that make a man deserves really 
to be called human being. . . . Our people decided to answer as it had to do it. . . . We examined all 
the experiences; we were opened to all the opportunities, except that to give up socialism, to give 
up the conquests of the revolution, people’s unity, the power of the people, except those to give 
ourselves up and to accept that others are the masters of our destiny. . . . We had made our choice 
for a long time: socialism or death!” (Castro Ruz 1998). 
 
Figure 2. Cuban Income from Sugar Exports and from Tourism, 1991–2001 
(in million dollars) 
 
300
500
700
900
1100
1300
1500
1700
1900
2100
2300
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
sugar
tourism
 
 
Source: Calculations by the author, on the basis of Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas (various 
years). 
 
It was in this extremely difficult context that the revolutionary government engaged 
in fundamental reforms of the 1990s. The “special period in time of peace” began. 
Specifically, the response to the crisis consisted, initially (1990–93), of resisting external 
shocks by distributing the cost of the adjustment and the supply restriction. In a second 
response period (1993–96), the government attempted to reactivate the productive forces 
related to the external sector in order to achieve a quick and favorable reintegration into 
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the world economy. In a third response period (1997–2000), the goal was to improve 
efficiency to reduce external pressure. The key measures in each period were geared 
toward equipping the economy with new growth engines to relieve the sugar sector and 
to generate cash receipts. The dollarized entries of capital associated with tourism, 
foreign direct investment, and the sending of currencies from abroad favored growth 
recovery. The Cuban choice to remain socialist bore its fruits: Growth recuperación and 
macroeconomic internal balances took place at the end of 1994. Tourism replaced sugar 
as a strategic priority and is one of the keys to Cuba’s economic success (Figure 2 and 
Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Average Production of Sugar in Cuba by Historical Period, 1755–2005 
(million tons) 
 
 
Colonial period (1755-1898) : 
1755-1799 : 
1800-1849 : 
1850-1894 : 
1895-1898 : 
 
 
0.2323 
0.0139 
0.0923 
0.6025 
0.2738 
 
 
Imperialist period (1899-1958) : 
1899-1913 : 
1914-1918 : 
1919-1928 : 
1929-1940 : 
1941-1945 : 
1946-1958 : 
 
 
3.3579 
1.3981 
3.2872 
4.3980 
2.7652 
3.4280 
5.3664 
 
 
Revolutionary period (1959-2005) : 
1959-1971 : 
1972-1989 : 
1990-1993 : 
1994-2002 : 
2003-2005 : 
 
 
5.7482 
5.6579 
7.1516 
6.7488 
3.7988 
2.2333 
 
 
Source: Calculations by the author. 
 
Consequently, one of the most important structural reforms was that of the sugar 
industry. Despite the extent of the reformation, the “end” of sugar specialization took 
place in a few months and involved a broad consultation of the workers. Accelerated in 
2002, these reforms meant that 70 sugar refineries would be closed; production would 
be concentrated in the most efficient centrales; management would be trained to 
accommodate the modernization of equipment; more than one million hectares would 
be released for stock-farming or cultivation; and above all, more than 100,000 workers 
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would be retrained and employed in new areas. As for agriculture taken as a whole, 
where results recorded since the crisis are most disappointing, the dilemma is to solve 
the difficulties encountered without permitting land liberalization. Some authors 
advocate this option in order to motivate the peasants. Nevertheless, the history of 
prerevolutionary Cuba shows the disappearance of the Amerindian cultures and 
knowledge (sixteenth century), of huge cattle estates (seventeenth century), of sugarcane 
plantations worked by slaves (eighteenth to nineteenth centuries), and of latifundios and 
sugar refineries, where a wage-earning proletariat of cane cutters worked, and workers 
of centrales (1886–1958). 
This is the history of small-scale farmers fought by the great landowners, rejected to 
the margins of latifundios, and forced to labor to ensure the sugar supply. In spite of the 
land reform and the maintenance of a private sector in agriculture, five decades of 
revolution were not sufficient to (re)build this peasantry. Land privatization would 
surely lead to the resurgence of the unequal, polarized land structure of the past.2 We 
must be aware that the latifundio remains one of the worst enemies of the Latin 
American people. But this does not reduce the critical need to engage in drastic reforms 
in agriculture, such as making rational import substitutions in the agricultural 
consumption sector (for the domestic market as well as for tourism), making Cuba’s 
exporting role more dynamic (including exporting new organic products, for example, 
fruit), and adapting institutions and management methods to the conditions of more 
intensive agriculture. 
It is clear that the role of the state is absolutely crucial in the present restructuring of 
the Cuban economy, as well as in its future successes—and, especially, in socialist 
planning. The state effected this reorganization at a minimal socioeconomic cost and 
achieved its essential goal of preserving the social system, thanks to the centralization of 
a certain number of key decisions, the coordination between its micro and macro 
policies, and the affirmation of the primacy of social needs over any other interest. As a 
dollarized sector, tourism distorts access by Cubans to U.S. currency, but the state 
organizes transfers of the receipts generated to ensure the continuity of the social 
system. Foreign direct investment and joint ventures were encouraged, involving 
autonomous outflows of capital and sometimes destabilizing the working relationships. 
The state protected the laws of labor and the role of labor unions while limiting wage 
differentials. Even during the dollarization period, each foreign firm paid wages in 
foreign currency through a “bridge company,” which paid, in a second step, the 
workers’ wages in Cuban pesos— the difference financing public spending. 
Furthermore, the attention of the state had also to be redoubled in order to fight against 
corruption. 
The sending of currencies from abroad increased the concern over inequalities, but 
the state has always firmly prevented all private accumulation of capital. Work for one’s 
own account was authorized, allowing the rise of a lot of activities (in trade, in craft 
industries, in the provision of services, and so forth), without legalization by the state of 
the recruiting of employees, except by the family holding the licenses. Stores were also 
opened where the transactions were conducted in dollars (or in convertible pesos), as 
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well as agricultural markets (agropecuarios) in which private peasants, recent recipients 
of land distributions, cooperatives, and state farms can sell part of their production. 
Nevertheless, the majority of basic goods continues to be provided to the people, at very 
low prices, by the state food system (libreta), by the working canteens, and by the 
restoration of collectives in schools and hospitals (73 percent) or directly by home-
grown produce (13 percent)— that is to say that only 14 percent of food consumed is 
bought on the so called free markets. Moreover, the army is frequently solicited to 
supply the official state markets with foodstuffs. The “free” sales made it possible for a 
number of peasants to grow rich, but these liquidities did not enhance capital dynamics 
or control any creation of value by the private use of wage-earning work. In brief, if the 
Cuban state had to admit, temporarily, the penetration of market mechanisms, it seems 
to have succeeded in submitting them to the benefits of the people. Thus, it is not 
possible to speak, until now, of a “transition” to capitalism in Cuba. 
 
Notes 
 
(*) Rémy Herrera (economist) is a full-time researcher at the CNRS (French National Centre for 
Scientific Research) and teaches at the University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. 
E-mail: herrera1@univ-paris1.fr. 
 
1. For more details, see Herrera (2005). 
2. For a historical perspective, see Herrera (2003). 
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